

IAC-D-100/18  
20 July 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE


Validity Study of NIE 91-54:

Probable Developments in Argentina:

published 9 March 1954

The attached validity study of NIE 91-54, "Probable Developments in Argentina," published 9 March 1954, was noted by the IAC on 17 July 1956 (IAC-M-247, 17 July 1956, item 10 c).

25X1A

  
Secretary

IAC-D-100/18  
20 July 1956

Validity Study of NIE 91-54:

Probable Developments in Argentina,

published 9 March 1954

1. NIE 91-54 did not anticipate the revolution which drove Peron from power in 1955. We did not foresee that Peron would adopt a virulent anti-Church policy such as developed after 1954, or the effects of such a policy on the political scene. It overestimated Peron's ability, through the policy of moderation followed after 1952, to repair army loyalty shaken by the activities of Eva Peron prior to her death in July of that year. NIE 91-54 also failed to give adequate weight to the intentions and political determinations of the Argentine armed forces, especially the navy. At the same time, it underestimated the negative effects of Peron's policy of collaboration with the US on his support and in providing, in connection with petroleum development, an issue with patriotic overtones that lent itself to exploitation by his opponents.

2. The unforeseeable developments with respect to the Church and the inadequacies of analysis indicated above produced the erroneous conclusion that Peron, barring accidents or assassination, would be safe through 1955. It was correctly anticipated that Peron's disappearance would produce a struggle for power and that an army-backed caretaker government would succeed him, but the implication in NIE 91-54 that the navy would play a minor role rather than, as it now does in fact, a determining one, was mistaken. The likelihood of army disunity, which is a necessary condition of the navy's current political significance, and the existence of navy leaders able and willing to assume political power were not sufficiently considered.

3. Conclusion as to the validity of our estimate that any successor government to Peron would probably follow the same general internal and external policies must be reserved pending political stabilization in Argentina.